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 The Freudian Thing and the Ethics of Speech 
 Daniel Wilson 
 
In his 1891 On Aphasia Freud defines the “thing” in the terms of J.S. Mill’s 
empiricist phenomenology as a set of sensory impressions that is linked both to 
language and to immediate sensory experience.  These distinctions structure the 
Project for a Scientific Psychology and reappear in “The Unconscious,” where 
Freud writes that the unconscious is a scene of experience that is linked to, but 
continues to insist in excess of, language.  While Lacan opposes das Ding to 
Freud’s definition, in “The Unconscious,” of the “unconscious Vorstellungen” as 
“the presentation of the thing alone,” this essay argues that Freud’s definition of 
the unconscious points to a scene of experience disorganized by language, that 
is censored by the passage through the mirror stage, and about which the Other 
knows nothing.  The essay ends by looking at several texts by Tito 
Mukhopadhyay, who is autistic.  Mukhopadhyay describes his autism in terms of 
a decision to not pass through the mirror stage, which left him exposed to a 
scene of experience disorganized by the desire carried on the Other’s voice. In 
his eventual decision to enter into language and write of his experience, 
Mukhopadhyay’s writings locate an ethics of speech that, rather than censor the 
unconscious presentation of the thing by linking it to a prohibited Oedipal object, 
makes a space within the discourse of the Other for a universal dimension of 
human experience.   
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asked after the relationship between Freud’s invention of psychoanalysis and 
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between psychoanalysis and the history and philosophy of science.  
 
 
In his reading of das Ding Lacan draws out a line of psychoanalytic thought that 
addresses the solitude of the subject confronted with the “object” that is “the 
absolute Other of the subject” ”(Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 52).  Das Ding 
becomes the bedrock of a psychoanalysis that addresses the subject of 
language as such, beyond the natural processes of the organism and before the 
subject is taken into the systems of laws that regulate the social order.  
If it is Lacan’s reading that sustains the Thing as a contemporary 
psychoanalytic term, it is equally true that the Thing is a central technical term in 
Freud’s thought.  Yet while Lacan approaches the Freudian Thing through 
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Heidegger, Kant, and Sade, showing how Sade reveals the perverse truth of 
Kantian ethics as an approach to the “emptiness at the center of the real that is 
called the Thing”(Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 121), Freud himself theorizes the 
Thing in the terms of J.S. Mill’s empiricist phenomenology, as a scene of 
experience that can be linked to, but which continues to insist in excess of, the 
signifier.  Jacques Le Rider has argued that “a specifically ‘Austrian’ philosophy 
[was] closer to ‘English’ thinking than to anything post-Kantian” (12), and that in 
particular, “John Stuart Mill seemed to be exercising a greater influence on 
Viennese modernity than Kant” (12). As Patricia Kitchner and Michael Molnar 
have noted, from his 1891 monograph On Aphasia, Freud defines both the 
“thing,” and the relationship between the “thing” and the “word” through the 
“philosophical teaching” of “J.S. Mill”(On Aphasia, 78), according to which the 
“thing” is logically equivalent to a set of sensory impressions.1  The relationship 
of the “thing,” inscribed as a durable scene of experience, to the “word” that links 
the thing to an object of perception, returns in the pre-psychoanalytic Project for 
a Scientific Psychology, and in Freud’s 1915 metapsychological papers the 
opposition between the “thing” and the “word” structures the distinction between 
conscious and unconscious experience.  When Freud writes that “the 
unconscious presentation is the presentation of the thing alone [die unbewußte 
(Vorstellung) ist die Sachvorstellung allein]” (“The Unconscious,” XIV, 201) he 
locates the real of the unconscious as a scene of unconscious memory traces 
that predate the subject’s entrance into language.  In these terms, the singularity 
of the Thing, which insists in excess of any signifier, is a scene of experience 
about which the Other knows nothing.  This set of unconscious experiences 
constitutes the Thing as a lost object that appears nowhere in reality, and as the 
unconscious orientation that insists as the excluded center of subjective 
experience. 
In what follows I want to suggest that Lacan’s reading of das Ding 
presents a superficial obstacle to a fully articulated Lacanian reading of the 
Freudian Thing.  In The Ethics of Psychoanalysis Lacan introduces what is, for 
Freud, an artificial distinction between Freud’s discussion of das Ding in the 
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Project for a Scientific Psychology—as the alien object that is isolated in the 
subject’s experience of the Other—and Freud’s definition, in “The Unconscious,” 
of the unconscious as “the presentation of the thing alone”(XIV, 201).  The 
interest in reading the Freudian Thing through Lacan, if slightly against the grain 
of Lacan’s own reading of Freud, is that Freud’s theorization of the Thing brings a 
certain attention to the Thing as a scene of experience that remains the “absolute 
Other” of the subject.  If Lacan’s reading of the Thing tends to approach the 
foundational void in signification from the side of language, showing that an 
articulated signifying structure—whether ethical, legal, or logical—turns around 
an unapproachable void at its center, Freud’s definition of the “Thing” registers 
that the Thing is a scene of unconscious experience about which the Other 
knows nothing.   
In the essay that follows I begin by tracing out Lacan’s distinction of das 
Ding from the “unconscious presentation of the thing” before giving a brief 
genealogy of the Thing, from Freud’s On Aphasia through the Project for a 
Scientific Psychology and “The Unconscious.” I then turn to Lacan’s mirror stage 
to suggest that the disorder of experience that Lacan locates in the time before 
the mirror stage be read in relation to Freud’s definition of the unconscious as 
“the presentation of the thing alone”(XIX, 201).  In these terms the mirror stage, 
through which the subject exchanges the real of his or her lived experience for 
the image that comes from the Other, is the initial, and structurally unstable, 
linking of the Thing to the signifying order.   
To ask how a scene of experience—the unconscious presentation of the 
thing—is equally what Lacan calls das Ding, the hole in the real caused by the 
signifier, I end by looking at several texts by Tito Mukhopadhyay.  
Mukhopadhyay—who is autistic—describes his experience as a decision not to 
pass through the mirror stage, which leaves him alone with the unconscious 
presentation of the thing at work in his body, an experience that he describes as 
the effect of the voice.  Mukhopadhyay’s writings locate the Thing not only as a 
theoretical object—what Lacan refers to as a “primordial function”(Ethics, 62)—
kept at a safe distance by an articulated symbolic structure, but as a scene of 
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lived experience with respect to which he must take a position.  These writings 
not only provide a window to a specifically autistic experience, but describe a 
fundamental dimension of experience at stake for all subjects, an experience that 
registers the fact that the effects of language go beyond what can be known 
within, or controlled by, discourse. Mukhopadhyay’s decision to write of this real 
locates an ethics of speech that does not censor the Thing by producing an 
object in the place of the Thing—by “raising the object to the dignity of the 
Thing”(Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 157), as Lacan writes of sublimation—but which 
rather gives voice to a universal scene of experience.   
 
I. Between das Ding and the “unconscious Vorstellungen” 
In The Ethics of Psychoanalysis Lacan appeals to a “subtle opposition in German 
[…] between the two terms that mean ‘thing’—das Ding and die Sache”(43).  
Lacan writes that “the Sache is clearly the thing, a product of industry and of 
human action as governed by language […] Sache and Wort are, therefore, 
closely linked; they form a couple.  Das Ding is found somewhere else”(45). 
When Freud writes that “the unconscious presentation is the presentation of the 
thing alone [die unbewußte (Vorstellung) ist die Sachvorstellung allein]” (XIV, 
201) Lacan thus reads this as a reference to a scene of experience that is 
organized, in advance, by the signifier.  As Lacan writes, the “Vorstellung is 
already organized according to the possibilities of the signifier as such”(Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis, 61).  While the unconscious Sachvorstellung is governed by the 
laws of language, by “the laws of metaphor and metonymy”(Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis, 61), “the Ding is the element that is initially isolated by the 
subject in his experience of the Nebenmensch as being by its very nature alien, 
Fremde”(Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 52).  Whereas the Sachvorstellung is an 
organized unconscious representation, das Ding is the subjective effect of the 
first encounter with the Other.  As Lacan writes “das Ding is a primordial function 
which is located at the level of the initial establishment of the gravitation of the 
unconscious Vorstellungen”(62). Das Ding registers a primordial encounter, while 
the unconscious Sachvorstellung is the unconscious position that the subject 
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takes with respect to the Thing.   
Yet it is not at all clear that Freud himself distinguishes between das 
Ding—as an element that is isolated in the experience of the Other—and the 
“unconscious Vorstellungen.”  Whereas Lacan writes that “Freud speaks of 
Sachvorstellung and not Dingvorstellung”(45), Freud writes in “Mourning and 
Melancholia,” “the unconscious (thing-) presentation of the object [die unbewußte 
(Ding) Vorstellung des Objekts] […] is made up of innumerable single 
impressions (or unconscious traces of them)”(XIV, 256).  Freud’s topographical 
model, put forward in On Aphasia and developed in the Project for a Scientific 
Psychology—where Freud writes of the Nebenmensch—and “The Unconscious,” 
argues that the Thing is indistinguishable from a set of unconscious memory 
traces that is only later linked to the order of language.  In terms of Lacan’s 
metapsychology, the “unconscious presentation of the thing” is not a presentation 
of the Thing organized by language, but rather the inscription of experience in the 
subject not only before the subject has entered into the symbolic space of 
language, but before the child has entered into either the imaginary relationship 
that is structured by the mirror stage. The Thing, as a scene of experience that is 
the absolute Other of the subject, is equally a void at the center of all that is 
articulated in the discourse of the Other.   
 
II. The empiricist Thing: From On Aphasia to Freud’s metapsychology 
 Freud’s initial theorization of the Thing as a scene of experience comes in his 
pre-psychoanalytic On Aphasia. On Aphasia begins as a polemic against the 
then dominant theory of “neural localization” where, as Freud writes, “the speech 
apparatus consists of distinct cortical centres; their cells are supposed to contain 
the word images (word concepts or word impressions); these centres are said to 
be separated by functionless cortical territory, and linked to each other by 
association tracts”(54).  Paul Broca and Carl Wernicke had discovered specific 
cortical centers that seemed to be responsible for the separate functions of 
speech and comprehension.  Whereas a lesion in Broca’s area leads to an 
expressive aphasia, where one can understand, but only speak with difficulty, a 
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lesion in Wernicke’s area results in a sensory aphasia, where one can speak 
fluently—though sometimes nonsensically—but cannot understand.  It thus 
seemed that certain cortical centers stored words, while other cortical centers 
stored the object that the word referred to.  
Against the idea that the object and word are stored in a distinct cortical 
centers, separated by “functionless cortical territory,” Freud proposes that the 
brain is a complex network of connections, and that when lesions cause 
aphasias it is not because the “word image” or the “idea of the object” that is 
stored in specific cells is destroyed, but because a dense network of associations 
is disrupted.  Freud thus argues that “the speech area is a continuous cortical 
region within which the associations and transmissions underlying the speech 
functions are taking place; they are of a complexity beyond comprehension”(62).  
It is just here that the question of the “thing” arises, for Freud needs to show how 
the “idea (concept) of the object [Die Object-Vorstellung]” appears within the 
complex web of associations that form the “continuous cortical region.”   
The word, then, is a complicated concept built up from various 
 impressions, i.e., it corresponds to an intricate process of associations 
 entered into by elements of visual, acoustic and kinesthetic origins.  
 However, the word acquires its significance through its association with 
 the “idea (concept) of the object,” at least if we restrict our consideration to 
 nouns.  The idea, or concept, of the object is itself another complex of 
 associations composed of the most varied visual, auditory, tactile, and 
 kinesthetic and other impressions.  According to philosophical teaching, 
 the idea of the object contains nothing else; the appearance of a “thing” 
 [eines Dinges] the “properties” of which are conveyed to us by our senses, 
 originates only from the fact that in enumerating the sensory impressions 
 perceived from an object, we allow for the possibility of a large series of 
 new impressions being added to the chain of associations (J.S. Mill). This 
 is why the idea of the object does not appear to us as closed, and indeed 
 hardly as closable, while the word concept appears to us as something 
 that is closed though capable of extension.  (On Aphasia, 78).    
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The “word” acquires its signification by being linked to the “idea (concept) of the 
object.”  The “thing,” to which the word refers, exists as an open set of associated 
sensory impressions. 
  In a footnote to the above passage, Freud refers his reader to a section of 
Mill’s A System of Logic entitled  “Of the Things Denoted by Names” as well as to 
Mill’s An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy.  In “Of the Things 
Denoted by Names” Mill begins by proposing to call any substantial object a 
“Thing.” It seems that a “Thing” is a substance, a body.  Yet “a body” Mill writes, 
“is not anything intrinsically different from the sensations which the body is said 
to produce in us; it is, in short, a set of sensations, or rather, of possibilities of 
sensation, joined together according to a fixed law”(58).  In An Examination of Sir 
William Hamilton’s Philosophy, Mill proposes, as a formal definition of matter, the 
“Permanent Possibility of Sensation.”  Mill writes that “both philosophers and the 
world at large, when they think of matter, conceive it really as a Permanent 
Possibility of Sensation. But the majority of philosophers fancy that it is 
something more; and the world at large, though they have really, as I conceive, 
nothing in their minds but a Permanent Possibility of Sensation, would, if asked 
the question, undoubtedly agree with the philosophers”(Hamilton, 200).  For Mill, 
the “thing” is the set of its “properties,” a set of sensory impressions joined 
together by the fixed law of association.  The stability of the “thing” comes from 
the fact that these sensations remain a permanent possibility, even when they 
are not part of immediate experience. 
In order to argue that the referent of language is an associated set of 
discrete impressions Freud turns Mill’s empiricist phenomenology into an 
associationist theory of neural structure, and Mill’s definition of the Thing as a 
scene of experience that is linked to the “word” will come to occupy a central 
place in Freud’s metapsychology.  A second important contribution of On 
Aphasia is the distinction between the cortical region where the “thing” is 
inscribed as a set of associations of a “complexity beyond comprehension,” and 
the peripheral nervous system.  For while there are no “cortical centers” in the 
speech region, Freud proposes that because of the “anatomical fact of the 
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termination of the sensory nerves”(On Aphasia, 66) there are indeed “centers for 
the visual and auditory nerves, and for the motor organs of speech”(On Aphasia, 
66).  Freud thus distinguishes between a “continuous cortical region” with a 
“complexity beyond comprehension” where the “thing” exists as a set of memory 
traces, and a peripheral system that has to do with the direct experience of 
sensory impressions. Three distinct elements thus appear in On Aphasia, that 
will return in the Project and “The Unconscious.”  First, there is the inscription of 
the Thing as a set of memory traces in the “complexity beyond comprehension” 
of the “continuous cortical region.”  Second there is the “word” which refers to the 
“thing.”  Third, there is localizable sensory apparatus—the peripheral nervous 
system—which receives sensory data about objects that are immediately present 
to experience.  Freud’s articulation of metapsychological structure will unfold 
around the question of how language both succeeds and fails to link the Thing—
a durable association of unconscious memory traces—to the sensory 
impressions, conveyed by the peripheral nervous system, that constitute the field 
of reality. 
As On Aphasia distinguishes between the “continuous cortical region,” 
where the thing is inscribed as a set of impressions, and the “centers for the 
visual and auditory nerves”(On Aphasia, 66), the Project begins by distinguishing 
between the peripheral system, which “receives external stimuli,”(I, 304) and the 
internal system, which is connected “only with the interior of the body” (I, 304). 
While a simple organism only has need of reflex actions, a human, who searches 
out objects that are not immediately present in reality, must be able to store the 
object of desire as a “thing-complex” within the internal system.  To coordinate 
the peripheral system with the internal system, the Project introduces 
consciousness as the system that judges whether or not the “thing-complex” 
inscribed in the internal system is present in an “attribute-complex” that is 
perceived by the peripheral system,  
Freud argues that the peripheral system cannot store energy, so when it is 
activated by a stimulus that introduces energy into the nervous system, the 
peripheral system must either respond to the stimulus with a reflex action, or 
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pass this energy on to the internal system.  If this energy is passed on to the 
internal system, the organism needs to judge whether the “attribute-complex” 
presented by the peripheral system corresponds to the “thing-complex”—the 
desired object that the subject is searching out in experience. The consciousness 
system is able to determine whether the “thing” corresponds to a perceptual 
object because consciousness is sensitive to what Freud calls the “quality” of 
energy that passes through the nervous system.  To this end, Freud 
distinguishes between the “quantity” and the “quality” of the energy that passes 
through the nervous system.  In the Project Freud works “to represent psychical 
processes as quantitatively determined states of specifiable material particles 
and so to make them plain and void of contradiction” (I, 295).  Freud continues 
that “the material particles in question are the neurons” (I, 295),  and that these 
neurons are invested with a quantity of energy.  The flow of energy through these 
neurons is guided by a principle of “neural inertia”—modeled after the principle of 
conservation of energy—that dictates that neurons divest themselves of 
energy—by passing it on to the next neuron—in order to return to a position of 
equilibrium.  The entire neural system, governed by this principle, works to divest 
itself of the quantities of energy that enter into the system through the form of 
external stimuli, in order to maintain a state of equilibrium.  Therefore, when a 
quantity of energy enters into the peripheral nervous system through an external 
stimulus, this same quantity of energy must either be expended in a reflex action, 
or passed on to the internal nervous system.  And yet the same quantity of 
energy, Freud reasons, could be transmitted with a different “temporal period”—
for example in ten small pulses, or in one large pulse.  While the peripheral  and 
internal systems respond only to the quantity of energy that moves through them, 
consciousness responds to this “temporal quality.”   
Freud argues that these variations in the temporal quality of the energy 
that passes through the brain depend on the external stimulus that introduces 
energy into the peripheral system.  When energy is passed from the peripheral 
system to the rest of the brain, this temporal quality “is transmitted without 
inhibition in every direction, as though it were a process of induction”(I, 310).  
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The internal system, which is only connected to the interior of the body, has a 
naturally “monotonous”(I, 310), which is to say uniform, “temporal quality.”  When 
an actual stimulus is perceived by the peripheral system, the “temporal quality” of 
this energy passes into the internal system, and thus modifies the monotonous 
period of “neuronic motion”(I, 310) in the internal system.  The consciousness 
system is able to perceive these modifications in period.  As Freud writes, “it is 
these modifications which pass from [the peripheral system] through [the internal 
system] to [the consciousness system], and there, where they are almost devoid 
of quantity, generate conscious sensations of qualities.  This transmission of 
quality is not durable; it leaves no traces behind it and cannot be reproduced”(I, 
310).  Freud writes that “indications of quality are [...] primarily indications of 
reality, and are intended to serve the purpose of distinguishing the cathexes of 
real perceptions from the cathexes of wishes” (I, 371).   
If in On Aphasia the opposition between the “thing” and the “word” is part 
of a general theory of signification, in the Project Freud defines the “thing-
complex” as a specific scene of experience—as the unconscious memory traces 
of the “subject’s first satisfying object (and also his first hostile object)”(I, 331).  
While consciousness serves to link the “thing-complex” to an “attribute complex,” 
neuroses develop when unconscious memories make it impossible for 
consciousness to accurately identify the “thing-complex” as a perceptual object. 
Freud gives the example of an hysterical woman who is “under a compulsion not 
to go into shops alone”(I, 353).  This compulsion is the effect of two repressed 
childhood memories which result in a faulty judgment of the relationship between 
the “attribute-complex” and the “thing-complex.”  In the first, two shop assistants, 
one of whom “attracted her sexually”(I, 353), were “laughing at her clothes”(I, 
353); in the second, “she had gone into a shop to buy some sweets and the 
shopkeeper had grabbed her genitals through her clothes”(I, 353). She has an 
unexplained fear because the idea of going into a shop alone “passes through a 
number of unconscious intermediate links”(I, 355). The repressed memories lead 
her to make a faulty judgment that the “attribute-complex” that she is confronted 
with when she goes into a shop alone is connected with the “thing-complex”—the 
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scene of desire linked to her first satisfactions and fears.  If she can reconstruct 
the repressed memory of this experience, she will no longer make a faulty 
judgment that she is in the presence of the Thing when she goes into a shop. 
Eliminating the repressed memories that result in an incorrect judgment that the 
“thing-complex” is present in reality should thus allow the subject to correctly 
identify the object of his or her desire.  
Yet the problem, as Freud writes, is that “the ‘thing-complex’ keeps 
reappearing in connection with a variety of ‘attribute-complexes’”(I, 371). In these 
terms, Freud’s invention of psychoanalysis is a response to his discovery that 
despite conscious judgments the Thing continues to trouble experience, as the 
real of subjective experience that is not caused by and does not correspond to 
any possible object of perception. When Freud returns to this metapsychological 
structure in “The Unconscious”—20 years after the Project—he no longer looks 
to consciousness to align the unconscious presentation of the thing with an 
object in reality, but rather theorizes that conscious judgments about the thing 
are wrong, because of a fundamental misalignment between the set of objects 
that are named in language, and the memory traces that comprise the 
unconscious presentation of the thing.  
Freud begins “The Unconscious” by separating these structures from their 
reference to neurophysiological location, writing that “[o]ur psychical topography 
has for the present nothing to do with anatomy”(XIX, 174).  In the Project Freud 
writes that “perceptual complexes are divided into a constant, uncomprehended 
portion—the thing—and a changing, comprehensible portion—the attributes or 
movements of the thing”(I, 371), and in “The Unconscious” this division 
reappears in the same terms as in On Aphasia, as the distinction between the 
“thing” and the “word.”  As Freud writes, “what we have permissibly called the 
conscious presentation of the object can now be split up into the presentation of 
the word and the presentation of the thing”(XIV, 201).  Freud continues that “the 
conscious presentation comprises the presentation of the thing plus the 
presentation of the word belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation is 
the presentation of the thing alone”(XIX, 201). While the unconscious is defined 
Konturen VIII (2015) 
 
144 
as the presentation of the thing, the preconscious serves to link the thing to the 
word.  Consciousness operates within the set of preconscious links between the 
thing and the word.  Thus, while consciousness exists where the “thing” is linked 
to the word, “being linked with word-presentations is not yet the same thing as 
becoming conscious, but only makes it possible to become so”(XIV, 192).  There 
are thus two logical moments where the unconscious presentation of the thing is 
censored: there is the censorship imposed by the preconscious when the thing is 
linked to the word, and there is the censorship imposed by consciousness when 
some of these links between the “thing” and the “word” are rejected. As Freud 
writes, “the Ucs. is turned back on the frontier of the Pcs.”  and while “derivatives 
of the Ucs. can circumvent this censorship,” when these derivatives “try to force 
themselves into consciousness, they are recognized as derivatives of the Ucs. 
and are repressed afresh at the new frontier of censorship, between the Pcs. and 
the Cs.”  Freud thus concludes that “the first of these censorships is exercised 
against the Ucs. itself, and the second against its Pcs. derivatives”(XIV, 193).  
The unconscious presentation of the thing—the thing before it is linked with the 
word and as it persists beyond the censorship of the preconscious—is a scene of 
experience that remains outside of language, at work in the subject as the cause 
of the symptoms and acts that subvert what the ego wants for itself in the social 
world.  There is an unbridgeable gap between the real of subjective experience, 
and that which is named as a possible object of perception within the discourse 
of the Other.  
 
III. The unconscious presentation of the “thing” in the body 
Lacan’s reading of das Ding in Freud turns around a passage in the Project 
where Freud asks what happens when a subject encounters “a fellow human-
being [nebenmensch]”(I, 331) within the perceptual field. 
[T]he complex of a fellow-creature falls into two portions.  One of 
these gives the impression of being a constant structure and 
remains as a coherent “thing” [Ding]; while the other can be 
understood by the activity of memory—that is, it can be traced back 
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to information about the subject’s own body.  (I, 331) 
The perceiving subject’s interest in his “fellow-creature” comes from the fact that 
the “thing-complex”— the trace of the “subject’s first satisfying object (and also 
his first hostile object”(I, 331)—is invested in a certain “attribute-complex.” In the 
language of the “The Unconscious,” where the “conscious presentation of the 
object” is “split up into the presentation of the word and the presentation of the 
thing”(XIV, 201), the perception of the “fellow-creature” links the unconscious 
presentation of the thing with an object that is named in the preconscious 
repository of signifiers, and thus potentially available to consciousness.  
In his first Seminar, Freud’s Papers on Technique, Lacan writes of the 
encounter with the “human other” in terms that are strikingly similar to Freud’s 
discussion of the encounter with the “fellow-creature.”   Lacan writes that “the 
function of the other, of the human other, is, in the adequation of the imaginary 
and the real”(Freud’s Papers on Technique, 139).  Lacan proposes that it is 
through the mirror stage that the “human other” takes on this function.  Humans 
are born “premature”(“The Mirror Stage,” 77) and unable to control their bodies.  
As the infant passes through the mirror stage he or she comes into an imaginary 
relationship with the body by identifying with the imaginary object that the mother 
is smiling at in the mirror.   It is only when the infant identifies with this beyond-of-
the-image—with the ideal object taken as the object of his or her mother’s 
desire—that he or she comes to inhabit the disorganized collection of objects that 
are reflected in the mirror.  
[T]he real objects, which pass via the mirror, and through it, are in the 
same place as the imaginary object.  The essence of the image is to be 
invested by the libido.  What we call libidinal investment is what makes an 
object become desirable, what is to say, how it becomes confused with 
this more or less structured image which, in diverse ways, we carry with 
us” (Freud’s Papers on Technique, 141).   
When these “real objects” which cross the mirror plane, are organized by the 
image—which will form the basis of the ideal ego—that the child receives from 
the Other, there is an adequation of the “imaginary” and the “real.”  The function 
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of the mirror stage is thus to attach the visual experience of the body in the mirror 
to the “structured image” that the child receives from the Other.  
Freud writes that the preconscious censors the unconscious presentation 
of the “thing” by linking it to a word—to something that can be named as an 
object of conscious perception in the discourse of the Other. Through the mirror 
stage, Lacan describes the process through which the unconscious presentation 
of the thing is censored as it is attached to an image that comes from the Other. 
In terms of Freud’s topography, the mirror stage describes the process through 
which the preconscious censors the unconscious presentation of the thing by 
linking it to something that comes from the Other.  Not only is the mirror image a 
two dimensional representation of the objects that are directly opposite the 
mirror, but the child who sees him or herself in the mirror is faced with a visual 
representation of the body from which lived experience has been evacuated.  
The unconscious presentation of the thing, in other words, is neither in the “real 
objects” nor in the “imaginary object.”  Rather, a libidinal investment that comes 
from the Other—through the imaginary object that the child takes as the object of 
his or her mother’s desire—appears at the place of the experiential dimension 
that is censored by the presentation of the “real objects” in the mirror.  The mirror 
stage thus is comprised of two logical moments.  In the first moment, the child 
sees the “real objects” reflected in the mirror, as the body reflected in the mirror 
is divested of its experiential dimension.  In the second moment the “imaginary 
object,” which the child takes as the object of the Other, comes at the place of 
the experiential dimension that is censored from the “real objects” as they pass 
through the mirror plane.     
In his Seminar X, Anxiety, Lacan locates the structure of psychosis with 
respect to these two moments, as a “captivation” that intervenes between the 
passage of the “real objects” through the mirror plane, and the identification with 
the imaginary object—the “structured image”—that would provide an imaginary 
coherence to the real objects reflected in the mirror.  To understand psychosis, 
Lacan writes,  
It suffices to refer to the moment I have marked as characteristic of the 
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experience of the mirror and paradigmatic of the construction of the ideal 
ego in the space of the Other—the moment where the infant turns his 
head, tracing the familiar movement that I have described to you, towards 
this Other, this witness, this adult who is there behind him, to 
communicate to her, by his smile, the manifestations of his jubilation 
about something, let us say, that makes him communicate with this 
specular image.  If the relation that is established with the specular image 
is such that the subject is so captivated by the image that this movement 
is not possible, then the pure dual relation will dispossess him of his 
relation to the big Other.  (Seminar X, 142) 
The infant who is in a psychotic position is captivated by the image in the mirror, 
and thus does not turn his or her head towards the Other.  Because the infant 
does not turn his or her head, he or she does not identify with the imaginary 
object of the Other’s gaze.  The infant does not identify with what will become the 
ideal ego in the space of the ego ideals sustained by the Other, but rather takes 
refuge in the “real objects” reflected in the mirror in order to flee the “thing” at 
work in the body.  
 
IV. From the “thing” at work in the body to the ethics of speech  
In several remarkable books, the first of which was written when he was eight 
years old, Tito Mukhopadhyay describes his traumatic experience of a “scattered 
self” and “fragmented world,” his captivation by the “virtual world” of objects that 
pass through the mirror plane, and his refusal of the image from the Other that 
would come at the place of this real at work in the body.  Because he does not 
pass through the mirror stage he is caught between the overwhelming 
experience of the Thing and the captivation by the mirror that censors the 
unconscious presentation of the thing in the body.  Lorna Wing writes, in her 
introduction to The Mind Tree, that beginning “from the time he was about 2 ½ 
years old” his mother “used the technique, familiar to parents and teachers of 
child with autism, of moving his limbs through the motions needed for each task, 
including pointing, until he learnt the feel of the muscle movements”(xi).  Using 
Konturen VIII (2015) 
 
148 
this technique of “facilitated communication”(xi) he learned to “read and write by 
using an alphabet board [and] from the age of six years he has written by himself 
using a pencil”(x). Mukhopadhyay’s books are about his experience of his 
autism, and about the relationship of this experience to language.  His writings 
identify a vector of language that does not censor the Thing, by linking it to an 
object of possible conscious perception in reality, but rather makes a space 
within the discourse of the Other for the real of his experience.  He constitutes 
himself as a speaking subject not through the identification with the object that 
comes from the Other, but through labor of writing of the real of his subjective 
experience.    
 Mukhopadhyay writes that the central problem of his autism is the lack of 
control over his body and his experience of a “scattered self” and “fragmented 
world.”  
The fragmented world needed unification 
Fragmented world of fear and pieces 
Beyond 'our' understanding and reaches 
Broken into bits and parts, 
With the cause of our escaping hearts! (The Mind Tree, 88) 
Mukhopadhyay continues that “This song is not sung lightly by the autistic hearts.  
This is a reason for their withdrawal.  This is the reason for their escape”(The 
Mind Tree, 88). Mukhopadhyay writes that when he was 2 years old he 
discovered that the “virtual world” that he could enter into by staring into a mirror 
granted him solace from this terrifying experience of the fragmented body.   
The boy refused to accept the existence of his body, and imagined 
himself to be a spirit.   
 Imagination took shape to lead his mind to a world of fantasies.  By 
mere wishing he could believe that he was there.  He believed that there 
was a world inside the mirror.  He felt that objects were as real as the 
objects around him.   
 ...[In the mirror] it was as silent as he wished it to be. The people 
were not in condition to use their voices, but they understood each other 
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well.  The children were also there.  But they just thought.  The people had 
the contentment of an abstract kind.  Their eyes actually showed what 
each one thought. […] 
 The 'mirror travel' was a great way to be free of the noise around.  
The more he did the better he felt. (The Mind Tree, 19-20) 
In his description of the mirror as a silent scene where there is no need for 
voices, Mukhopadhyay locates the audible as the dimension of experience that is 
censored by the passage of the “real objects” through the mirror.  The ambiguous 
unattached desire carried on the voice that gears into his body, that fragments 
the world, and scatters his self, is censored by the silent world of “mirror travel.” 
Captivated by the “real objects” reflected in the mirror, he refuses his 
mother’s efforts to interest him in the “imaginary object.”  When his mother tries 
to engage him in his image, by moving a “little handheld mirror as close as 
possible to my face, so that my real nose would touch the reflected nose” (How 
Can I Talk if my Lips Don’t Move, 16) he does not respond. 
I think I was supposed to laugh at the mirror play or whatever she wanted 
me to think it was.  Later, when I observed children, not though the eyes of 
the mirror but through my own reason and understanding, I realized that 
when there is something intense going on, there is an expectation of some 
kind of response.  So perhaps mother expected me to laugh at the mirror 
that was coming near me, touching my nose, and moving away from my 
nose, along with her animated voice.  I never responded. I was not 
interested in the nose reflection game.”(How Can I Talk if my Lips Don’t 
Move, 16) 
In refusing the image—the imaginary object—that comes from the Other, 
Mukhopadhyay is caught between the silent inhuman world of objects reflected in 
the mirror, and the excess of the voice at work in his body.  He both escapes 
from the excess of the thing and avoids entering into the space of the Other, 
where he would equally be exposed to the ambiguity of other’s desires.  In her 
psychoanalytic reading of autism Danielle Bergeron writes that “during the mirror 
stage, [the autistic] does not enter human language; for, to enter language 
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supposes that one accepts being affected by the desire and jouissance of the 
Other”(131). Bergeron continues that, “the autistic does not want to enter into the 
time or the space conditioned by the desire of the Other, nor to be delivered up to 
the Other in the Other’s space, as if he were working to ‘save his skin’ from the 
desire, the drive and the jouissance that would intrude through the voice of the 
Other, through the audible”(121-122). As Mukhopadhyay writes, “Human ears 
cannot hear anything other than sounds.  But not my ears, as I believed then.  
And not the ears of the mirror either.  I believed that if you cared enough to listen, 
you could hear the sky and earth speaking to each other in the language of blue 
and brown”(How Can I Talk if my Lips don’t Move?, 1).  In the mirror “the people 
had the contentment of an abstract kind.  Their eyes actually showed what each 
one thought.” The ambiguity of the Other’s desire is silenced by the univocity of 
the “language of blue and brown.”   
Mukhopadhyay describes his experience as disorganized by this 
detached, unanchored voice, yet it is equally this experience that takes him into 
language, as the basis of a speech through which he constructs himself, as the 
subject of an unpresentable real, within the space of the Other.  The turning point 
in Mukhopadhyay’s narrative comes when “he reasoned out that he might give it 
a try to be a ‘body’ instead of a 'spirit'”(The Mind Tree, 28).  This first effort to 
come into his body involves his discovery of “spinning” and “flapping.”  He writes:  
“He got the idea of spinning from the fan as he saw that its blades that were 
otherwise separate joined together to a complete circle, when they turned in 
speed”(The Mind Tree, 28).  The origin of his spinning is a metaphoric act, an 
effort to construct a unified world, through a relationship to the signifier.  As he 
continues to confront the real of the fragmented body, his mother encourages 
him to enter into language, and this entrance into language is accompanied with 
a loss of the “virtual” world of the mirror:  “He got angry with mother for educating 
him.  Many a time when he tried to get a feeling of bliss, by imagining fantasies, 
his knowledge about the subject prevents him to dive into the virtual.  It was 
irritating.  He could not 'feel' the virtual as he did before”(The Mind Tree, 42).  
Entering into language, and articulating his experience, Mukhopadhyay 
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constructs a relationship to his body.  He writes that  “the fragmented self of hand 
and body parts which I once saw myself as, have unified to a living ‘me’, striving 
for a complete ‘me’.  Not in the abstract existence of the impossible world of 
dreams but a hope for a concrete dream of this book to reach those who would 
like to understand us through me”(How Can I Talk if my Lips Don’t Move?, 89).  
By confronting the traumatic real of his body—“the fragmented self of hand and 
body parts”— as he enters into a relationship to the Other—“those who would 
like to understand us through me”— Mukhopadhyay constructs a “unified and 
living me.”  What Mukhopadhyay calls a “living me” must be distinguished from 
the ideal ego established in the space of the Other:  the “living me” is not 
constructed on the basis of the Other’s ideals, but rather through the work to 
make a place for a real within the space of the other, by giving voice to that which 
would have otherwise remained silent.  Mukhopadhyay, who did not pass 
through the mirror stage, who did not construct his ego in the space of the Other 
on the basis of the image he received back from the Other, lays bare this vector 
of ethical speech:  a speech on the basis of a real at work in the body.  This is a 
vector of speech that does not censor the real of experience by participating in a 
cultural elaboration of the forbidden object in order to cathect the “thing” in the 
signifiers of the Other, but which makes a space within the field of the Other for 
the experience of the “thing.”  
For the child who passes through the mirror stage, who identifies with the 
image that is returned by the mother, there is equally something in the subject 
that the Other does not recognize, that the Other does not want, and with which 
the subject is alone.  Beyond the fact of the libidinal investment in the image that 
is returned to the child by the mother, which forms the basis of the ego through 
which the subject situates him or herself in the discourse of the Other, the 
Freudian “thing” continues to work in the lived experience of the subject as that in 
the body which remains unaddressed to the Other.  As Lacan notes, this scene 
of experience, of the fragmented body, “is regularly manifested in dreams when 
the movement of an analysis reaches a certain level of aggressive disintegration 
of the individual […] in the form of disconnected limbs or of organs exoscopically 
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represented”(“The Mirror Stage,” 78).  In “The Mirror Stage” Lacan writes of the 
fragmented body as the consequence of the fact that humans are born 
“premature”(77).  Mukhopadhyay shows that this scene of experience is itself the 
presentation of the voice at work in the body.  In Freud’s language, at the same 
time that the unconscious presentation of the thing is censored by the 
preconscious (the Other as the locus of signifiers) as it is attached to a possible 
object of conscious perceptual experience, it continues to exert its presence in 
the experience of the body that remains outside of the address to the Other.  
Lacan writes that the ethics of psychoanalysis is to be “well-spoken, to find one's 
way in dealing with the unconscious”(Television, 22).  Reading this ethics 
alongside Freud’s definition of “the Ucs. [as] the region of the memory-traces of 
things (as contrasted with word-cathexes)”(XIV,  256), locates the ethics of 
psychoanalysis in a speech about unconscious experience, a speech about a 
real that remains unconscious, at work in the body, as the absolute other of the 
subject, and the cause of desire. Mukhopadhyay’s writings reveal this dimension 
of speech that, rather than link the real of unconscious experience to an object 
named in language, makes a space in the discourse of the Other for that which 
insists in experience as the real of the subject. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Patricia Kitchner writes that in On Aphasia, “Freud followed Mill in assuming 
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that […] a word acquired meaning by being associated with an ‘object-
representation’”(78).  Michael Molnar notes that “these ideas of object- and word- 
presentation are to recur in ‘The Unconscious’ as the traits differentiating 
conscious from unconscious mental activity”(112).  Neither Kitchner nor Molnar 
notes that Freud theorizes the ‘object-representation’ through the “thing,” nor 
notes the problematic of the “thing” in psychoanalytic thought.  
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